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ABSTRACT
Following the death of Mao in 1976, agrarian decision-making shifted from the collective to 
individual households, unleashing rapid growth in farm output and unprecedented reductions in 
poverty. In new data on reform timing in 914 counties, we find an immediate trend break in the 
fraction of male children following rural land reform. Among second births that followed a 
firstborn girl, sex ratios increased from 1.1 to 1.3 boys per girl in the four years following reform. 
Larger increases are found among families with more education and in counties with larger 
output gains due to reform. Proximately, increased sex selection was achieved in part through 
prenatal ultrasounds obtained in provincial capitals. The land reform estimate is robust to 
controlling for the county-level rollout of the One Child Policy. Overall, we estimate land reform 
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1 Introduction
Economic development has narrowed gender gaps over the past quarter century, including
those in educational attainment, life expectancy, and labor force participation (WorldBank,
2012). Nevertheless, perhaps the starkest manifestation of gender inequality – the “missing
women” phenomenon – can persist with development (DasGupta et al., 2003; Duflo, 2012).
Figure 1a shows its evolution in China. Despite rapid GDP growth since 1980, the sex ratio
at birth increased from 1.06 in 1978 to 1.20 in 2000. In 2010, the sex ratio remained 1.19,
or about 500,000 more male births per year than the biological norm of around 1.05 males
per female. Previous research on this perverse eﬀect of economic development has focused
on two mechanisms: reductions in the cost of sex selection (e.g. ultrasound diﬀusion in Chen
et al., 2013) and reduced fertility (e.g. Jayachandran (2017)). Surprisingly, China’s sex ratios
started to rise in 1980, when costs of sex selection were high, and moreover when fertility
was relatively flat (Figure 1b). Why?
Figure 1: Sex ratios, GDP and Fertility in China: 1970-2000
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Notes: GDP per capita (current US$) data are from World Bank. Sex ratios are aggregated from microdata
of the 1982, 1990 and 2000 Census. Data on total fertility rate are from Cai (2008).
We propose a new factor aﬀecting sex selection: 1978-84 land reform in rural China (then
home to 86% of the Chinese population). Introduction of the “Household Responsibility
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System” unraveled collectivized agriculture and marked a critical first step toward a mar-
ket–based economy. The reform granted land user-ship rights to individual households on a
long-term basis, while land ownership remained with the collective. It is well documented
that land reform spurred remarkable growth in agricultural output (McMillan et al., 1989;
Lin, 1992) and lifted hundreds of millions of rural households out of poverty (WorldBank,
2000).1 The main empirical challenge is to disentangle the eﬀect of land reform from that of
the One Child Policy (OCP), which started around the same time.
We analyze new data from primary sources, including county records on land reform
adoption in 914 counties, covering half of the rural population, and merge these with the
1990 population Census microdata. Previous research focused on the rollout to 28 provinces
(Lin, 1992). We also collect previously unanalyzed data on the county-by-county rollout of
the OCP during 1979-83. There is substantial variation in the timing of both land reform
and the OCP at the county level, which enables us to evaluate both policies and capture their
interactions. Our focus on the local rollout of signature national policies parallels recent work
on US counties, e.g., Isen et al. (2017); Hoynes et al. (2016).
Our empirical strategy is based on a demographic regularity: the sex ratio of the first child
is biologically normal but becomes abnormally male-biased at higher birth orders, especially
among Chinese families with no previous son (Zeng et al., 1993). We find a clear increase
in the fraction male for second children in families without a firstborn son. Prior to land
reform, we do not see trends in this sex ratio. Nor do we see substantial increases in sex
ratios following land reform for either the firstborn child or the second child if the first
child was male. These raw patterns are replicated in our regression estimates that remove
unrestricted county by year fixed eﬀects. We find a precisely estimated trend break of 0.7
percentage points per year in the fraction of males following a first girl after land reform,
which accumulates to a 2.8 percentage point increase four years post reform (isomorphic to
the raw sex ratio rising from 1.1 pre-reform to 1.3 post-reform).
We provide empirical evidence on potential confounders. These must mimic the rollout of
land reform by county and diﬀerentially aﬀect families with the first child being a daughter
versus a first son. From our systematic review of reform policies, candidate confounders do
not adhere to this precisely-prescribed pattern with one potential exception: the OCP. We
find robust results for land reform. Estimates on the land reform eﬀect are undiminished
when the county-level OCP rollout is controlled for. Second, land reform increased sex ratios
before the introduction of the rural OCP. We also find that the number of second births
is not aﬀected by land reform conditional on the OCP, reducing concerns about potential
changes in the composition of families caused by land reform.
1Using time-series data, McMillan et al. (1989) suggest that over three-quarters of the productivity increase
in 1978-84 could be attributed to land reform. Using provincial reform rollout, Lin (1992) finds that the reform
accounts for half of realized output growth.
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There is no shortage of explanations for why land reform may have increased sex selection.
A priori, we view two mechanisms as particularly plausible: increased income (wage and/or
non-labor income of parents) and a greater productivity benefit of sons. We formalize these
mechanisms in Appendix A.2 Empirically, we find more consistency with the income mecha-
nism. The sex selection response was concentrated among parents with more education and
in counties with higher income growth after reform. Within the subset of “productive son”
models, those that reward a second son would predict sex selection for first births as well as
for second births with an elder brother. However, these predictions are not supported by the
empirical evidence. Moreover, in areas/crops where males are more productive, “productive
son” models predict a larger sex selection response to land reform. Using previously unan-
alyzed occupation and industry codes from the 1982 Census, we do not find this predicted
heterogeneity. We discuss five additional hypotheses and likewise do not find supporting evi-
dence. That said, we are more circumspect in interpreting empirical evidence on mechanisms
than our reduced-form because our mechanism measures are relatively crude.
Finally, how did land reform increase sex selection? Parents might prefer to conceal sex
selection behaviors, and as such detecting them is “forensic economics” (Zitzewitz, 2012). Like
previous studies, we unfortunately do not have a direct measure of sex selection. But sex
ratios have a natural benchmark (1.05) and ultrasound technology was introduced in China’s
provincial capitals during the 1970s, permitting non-invasive prenatal sex determination.
Combining data on ultrasound machine diﬀusion to provincial capitals collected by Chen
et al. (2013) with the 1980 rail network data provided by Matthew Turner, we find larger
increases in sex ratios in rural counties with railroad connections to provincial capitals where
ultrasound machines were available. We also find increased sex selection due to land reform
in places where ultrasound was unavailable, possibly through greater postnatal selection. A
common feature of sex selection in both contexts is that parents find it costly.
The role of land reform in sex selection has gone unrecognized for more than thirty years,
we suspect, because county-level data on land reform timing were unavailable. Eﬀects of
China’s economic watershed are interesting per se and suggest a perverse eﬀect of economic
development. The persistence of sex selection among Asians in the West (Dubuc and Cole-
man, 2007; Almond and Edlund, 2008) underscores that factors beyond parochial ones like
the One Child Policy or physical brawn help account for “missing girls”.
2We consider the response of sex selection and fertility to either increased income or the increased oppor-
tunity cost of childrearing (wage) from land reform. A son increases parental utility, but may also increase
wages or income, i.e. a productivity channel.
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2 Background
2.1 The post-Mao land reform
From 1956 to 1977, China was a planned economy. In agriculture, prices were centrally
controlled and fixed, trading in the market prohibited, and production was organized col-
lectively in production teams, making it diﬃcult to monitor and reward individual eﬀort.
Unsurprisingly, China’s grain output per capita stagnated during this period (Zweig, 1987).
In 1978, two years after the death of Mao Zedong, the Chinese government initiated
some fledgling, “top down” reforms in an attempt to increase productivity. Party leaders
reached consensus on three national interventions: raising the long-depressed state procure-
ment prices for major crops, reducing grain procurement quotas, and opening inter-regional
trade (Perkins, 1988; Lin, 1992).3 More structural changes to agricultural production were
considered too radical by Mao’s designated successor Hua Guofeng.
The more substantive agricultural reform of 1978-84 thus came about as a grassroots
movement that broke with oﬃcial policy. At the end of 1978, a small number of production
teams in Anhui Province experimented with contracting land and assigning output quotas
to individual households. A year later, these teams harvested yields far larger than other
teams (Lin, 1992). As the movement spread, increased agricultural output softened oﬃcial
resistance. The Party’s prohibition was relaxed in 1979 by allowing exceptions for poor
regions. When Hua Guofeng was replaced by Zhao Ziyang in 1980 and Hu Yaobang in 1981,
the reform gained acceptance and was rolled out more quickly. In January 1982, Central
Document No.1 oﬃcially announced that “the Household Responsibility System (HRS) is the
production responsibility system of the socialist economy”.
In essence, land reform allowed collectives to allocate an equal share of land to each
individual; households could make input decisions and receive all residual income from land
after meeting procurement obligations to the state (Perkins, 1988). Land reform created
variation across time and space (Lin, 1992), which we will explore in the empirical analysis
below.
2.2 The One Child Policy in rural areas
China started the One Child Policy (OCP) in 1979 and financial penalties were introduced to
enforce it. While a strict one-child rule has been applied in urban areas since 1979, a second
child was allowed in rural areas until 1984. Only a third or higher-parity child in rural areas
was punished in the 1979-1983 period (Banister, 1987).4 Fertility control was decentralized
3Decentralized price and market reforms did not come until 1985, when the central government announced
that mandatory procurement quotas in agriculture were no longer permitted (Sicular, 1988).
4The rural OCP was changed in 1984 to allow a second child following a first girl, the so-called “1.5 Child”
Policy (Greenhalgh, 1986), which is unlikely a confounder to land reform because it came after land reform
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to local governments, and resistance from parents led to a gradual implementation of the
policy (Scharping, 2003). Overall in this period, penalties for above-quota births in rural
areas were relatively mild. More substantial fines were imposed only later (Ebenstein, 2010).
Fertility was higher following 1979 than commonly believed. As shown by Figure 1b, well
before the OCP, the total fertility rate fell by nearly half from 1970 to 1977. It “bottomed
out” at about 2.5 children around 1979, where it remained through out the early OCP period
until 1987. The macro trend suggests that the OCP played at most a modest role in aﬀecting
fertility during our study period.
3 Data
3.1 County-level reform rollout
Data on county rollout of land reform and the OCP come from county Gazetteers. Gazetteers
are compiled by local historians to record local history and draw upon materials in local
archives. They were not used in evaluating local oﬃcials and prima facie, are less susceptible
to misreporting. To empirically gauge the quality of Gazetteer data, we compare economic
statistics in Gazetteers to the commonly used statistics in yearbooks, on which cadre eval-
uation was based. Appendix Section B.1.1 reports results using gross production of grain
as an example. First, we document substantial agreement between the two data sources.
Second, we show that the Gazetteer measures respond more to rainfall and soil quality than
yearbook data. Third, we apply Benford’s Law in manner suggested by Varian (1972) to
detect fake data, where falsified digits tend to be made up uniformly. To summarize, we
find that Gazetteer data are similar to yearbook data but appear more accurate when they
disagree.
We conducted a comprehensive review of all county Gazetteers published to date. Our
primary analysis sample includes the 914 counties (half of China’s rural counties) that record
precise timing of both land reform and the OCP. These reporting counties are very similar
to other counties (Appendix Table A.5).
The start of land reform is defined by the year when collectively-owned land was first
contracted to individual households in a few villages for each county; it usually took 2-3
years for it to spread to the entire county. We find in Appendix Section B.1.2 that the
pattern in the county-by-county reform rollout is consistent with both government policies
discussed in Section 2.1 and the existing literature on the reform rollout by province.
We define the beginning of the OCP as the year when the county government issued the
first policy document to enforce penalties for above-quota, third births. The county rollout
data correspond to local implementation: we find that fertility reduction following the county
was completed. We discuss the “1.5 Child” Policy in Appendix Section C.4.
6
policy indeed occurred at the third parity and above (Appendix Table A.4). We also find
that fertility responses to the policy rollout scale up to replicate national fertility trends.
In Figure 2, the solid line represents the fraction of counties that started land reform
between 1978 and 1984 and the long-dotted line shows the rollout of the OCP, both scaled
by the vertical axis on the left. Despite similar timing in aggregate, land reform and the OCP
show substantial diﬀerences in their county-level rollout. Land reform came earlier than the
OCP in 27% of counties, in 25% they coincided, and in 48% the OCP came earlier (Appendix
Figure A.3). At the county level, the correlation between HRS timing and OCP timing is
-0.005.
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To confirm land reform’s previously-documented eﬀect on agricultural productivity, we
combine two variables in the Gazetteers to calculate grain output per capita: annual gross
production of grain divided by annual population by county. There are 415 counties that
report both the reform timing and complete year-by-year grain production and population
from the 1970s to the mid-1980s.5 Because county statistics have only been released system-
atically in yearbooks since the 1980s in China, Gazetteer data from the 1970s are particularly
valuable in assessing the timing of income increases as they relate to land reform.
5Appendix Table A.5 also shows that these counties with grain data are comparable to other counties.
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3.2 Diﬀusion of ultrasound technology to provincial capitals
Data on the diﬀusion of ultrasound are provided by Chen et al. (2013), also collected from
county Gazetteers. Just 4% of rural counties had ultrasound machines by 1982, when the
rollout of land reform was nearly completed. Although prenatal sex determination was all
but unavailable locally, it was accessible in certain provincial capitals. The first ultrasound
machine arrived in Xi‘an in Shaanxi province in 1965. Other provincial capitals started to
acquire their first machines in the late 1970s. In Figure 2, the short-dotted line shows the
rollout of ultrasound machines to the 30 provincial capitals (on the secondary vertical axis).
During the rollout of land reform, one option for pregnant women (especially for those in
rail-connected rural counties) was to travel to the provincial capital to ascertain fetal sex. In
Section 7, we examine to what extent sex selection induced by land reform operates through
ultrasound access in provincial capitals.
3.3 Sex ratios from census microdata
To consider child sex ratios during the reform period, we use the 1 percent sample of the
1990 Census microdata in 914 counties. We focus on individuals born 1974-86, who were
aged 4-16 in 1990.6 Our main sample includes second children in all families with at least
two children.7 In our study period, 92% of women over age 35 had at least two children.
Because the Chinese census does not explicitly query one’s birth order and sex of siblings,
we use information on one’s relationship to the household head to identify the household
head’s children and order these children using their month and year of birth.8 To verify
this order is complete, we require that the number of children linked to the household head
is equal to the number of surviving births reported.9 Even for the oldest cohort of second
children in our sample, we observe the firstborn child in their family because he/she was
still too young to leave home in rural China. Indeed, when we compare the distribution of
birth year of first children in the 1990 Census to that in the 1988 National Fertility Survey,
in which parents report complete fertility histories, the two distributions are nearly identical
(see Appendix Figure A.4).
An advantage of analyzing the 1990 Census is that internal migration was under strict
control and was not relaxed until the 1990s (Wang, 2005). Although the Chinese Census
6The National Bureau of Statistics reported that the child underreporting rate was 0.7%. While low, child
underreporting is more common under age 4 in the census year (Zhang and Zhao, 2006). Therefore, we focus
on children older than 4. We also check the robustness of estimates by including children under age 4.
7We also check the robustness of estimates using all births at the second parity and above.
8Twins and triplets (2.3% of all births) are not analyzed because birth order is more diﬃcult to identify
and interpret.
9In our sample, 81% of women report the number of surviving births equal to the number of children
observed in their family in the census. We also confirmed the robustness of estimates to including families
that report a diﬀerent number of surviving children than that observed in the family.
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does not query county of birth, one’s county of residence in 1990 maps very closely to county
of birth. The migration rate is 0.63% among families with children in our analysis sample.10
We exclude these migrants in our analysis.
Summary statistics are reported in Appendix Table A.6. The fraction of males among
first births is stable at 0.51 before and after land reform. Among second births following
a firstborn boy, the fraction of males remains about 0.5 before and after the reform. The
most striking change is observed among second births following a firstborn girl: the fraction
of males increases from 0.53 before land reform to 0.56 after the reform. Similarly among
all births at the second parity and above, the fraction of males following no previous son
increased by 4 percentage points after the reform, while the fraction is stable following at
least one previous son.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Event studies
We start by describing grain output and sex ratios before and after land reform (no regression
adjustment). The relatively flat trend of grain output per capita prior to reform (before time
0) in Figure 3 confirms sluggish productivity growth under the collective system. One year
after the reform started, it turns sharply to an upward sloping trend. We estimate the change
in slope in Appendix Table A.15 (column (1) of Panel A) and find a 3.5 percent increase
in grain output per capita per year following reform. The change in slope in agricultural
productivity is consistent with the gradual spread of the HRS within county (recalling that
our measure of land reform “turns on” when the first villages adopted HRS).11
10In the 1990 Census, a migrant respondent is defined as not residing in the same county in 1985.
11It is also possible that households gradually respond to the incentives under the HRS.
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Figure 4a presents sex ratios of first births by year of birth relative to the start of land
reform. The sex ratios are stable at the biologically normal rate of 1.05 before and after the
reform, suggesting the absence of sex selection among first births.
Figure 4b shows sex ratios of second children in families with a first girl and those with a
first boy before and after land reform. Importantly, there are no pre-existing trends of second
children’s sex ratios in either families with a first boy12 or families with a first girl. Moreover,
among families with a first boy, little change in sex ratios of second births is observed post
reform. In stark contrast, sex ratios following a first girl show sharp increases right after
the reform, from 1.1 to 1.3 six years post-reform. The slope change in the sex ratio trend
following first girl is consistent with the timing of the slope change of grain output in Figure
3: both departures were immediate but took several years to manifest fully.
12Following a first boy, girls are slightly more common than biological norm, as noted by Chen et al. (2015),
who argue that girls were adopted by families with sons.
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4.2 Econometric specification
To assess the post-reform slope change in sex ratios following a first girl, we estimate a trend
break model:
yijt =↵ +  1Ejt ⇤ GirlFirstijt+ 2Reformjt ⇤ Ejt ⇤ GirlFirstijt
+  3GirlFirstijt +  jt + ✏ijt, (1)
where i is family, j county of birth, and t year of birth. yijt is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the second child is male in family i. GirlFirstijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the first birth is a girl. Event time Ejt is defined as birth year minus the reform year and
is interacted with GirlFirstijt.  1 measures the average pre-reform trend in the fraction
of males among second births following a first girl. Reformjt is a dummy variable equal to
1 if one is born after the reform and is interacted with Ejt ⇤ GirlFirstijt. The coeﬃcient
of interest,  2, measures the average post-reform slope change in the trend of the fraction
of males following a first girl. The increase in the fraction of males k years post reform is
 2 ⇤ k. All regressions include GirlFirstijt, as well as county-by-year fixed eﬀects  jt to
absorb time-varying county characteristics.  jt also absorbs event time Ejt and the reform
indicator Reformjt main eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered by county.
In addition to the linear trend break model, we also estimate the average reform eﬀect
over the entire post-reform period in our sample by:
yijt = ↵ +  4Reformjt ⇤ GirlFirstijt +  5GirlFirstijt +  jt + ✏ijt. (2)
 4 measures the average post-reform increase in the fraction of males in families with a first
girl, compared to families with a first boy.
Our key identifying assumption is that without land reform the trends in the fraction
of male second births would be the same in counties that started earlier and those that
started later. The absence of pre-existing trends in Figure 4b supports the assumption. The
remaining concern would be about other policies that closely follow the county-level reform
rollout and have had diﬀerential impacts on the sex of the second child depending on the sex
of the first one. The most likely candidate is the OCP. In the following empirical exercise,
we disentangle the eﬀect of land reform from the OCP.
For second births following a firstborn boy to be a valid control group, sex of the firstborn
child should not be aﬀected by land reform.13 Figure 4a shows that the sex ratio of the
firstborns is at the biological level of 1.05. Finally, our analysis sample of second births
should not be selected based on our identifying variable. We therefore examine whether land
reform aﬀects fertility at the second parity diﬀerentially by the sex of the first child below.
13As predicted by the sex selection model described in Section 6.
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5 Main results
5.1 Land reform and sex ratios
Table 1 reports trend break estimates in Panel A and average eﬀect estimates in Panel B.
Regression-adjusted estimates yield the same results as the raw data displayed in Figures 4a
and 4b.
We first examine whether the sex of the first child is aﬀected by land reforms. In column
(1), the estimated trend break (Land reform*Event time) in Panel A and the estimated
average eﬀect (Land reform) in Panel B are quite small and not statistically significant.
Beyond the absence of sex selection for the first births following land reform, these findings
also suggest that a biological channel through nutritional improvement is less likely.14
Table 1: Land Reform and Male Births
Male
First Child Second Child
All All High education Low education
mothers mothers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Trend break
Land reform*Event time -0.001
(0.001)
Land reform*Event time*Girl first 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 325,633 241,547 125,601 115,943
R2 0.006 0.051 0.085 0.097
Panel B: Average eﬀect
Land reform 0.001
(0.005)
Land reform*Girl first 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.022***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 325,633 241,547 125,601 115,946
R2 0.006 0.051 0.085 0.097
County-by-year FE Y Y Y
County FE and YOB FE Y
County-specific linear trends Y
Notes: High education mothers completed elementary school. Trend break regressions on first children control
for Event time, and on second children Event time*Girl first. All regressions on second children also control
for Girl first. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. * significant
at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
14In particular, improved nutrition after land reform would disproportionately reduce mortality among
“fragile males” (Kraemer, 2000) but does not appear to be a major mechanism through which land reform
aﬀected sex ratios.
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In contrast, the probability of the second child being male increases with land reform if
the first child is a girl. For second births in column (2), the trend break (Land reform*Event
time*Girl first) in Panel A and the average eﬀect (Land reform*Girl first) in Panel B are
both precisely estimated. The estimated trend break is a 0.7 percentage points increase per
year in the fraction of males following a first girl after land reform. For example, four years
after the reform, 2.8 (0.7*4) percentage points more parents with a first daughter engaged in
successful sex selection of their second child than would have occurred had the pre-reform sex
ratio trend (flat) persisted. Again, this is highly consistent with the unadjusted event study
in Figure 4b. Correspondingly, we find in Panel B that the average eﬀect of land reform in
the post-reform period is 3 percentage points.15
If land reform aﬀects sex selection through the income mechanism, we would expect
parents with a larger income increase after land reform to be more likely to have male second
births. Absent an income measure from the Census, we use parental education as a proxy;
previous research finds that education contributed to higher agricultural productivity and
profits after land reform (Yang and An, 2002). Indeed, we find a large and highly significant
trend break among second births whose mothers have more education in column (3): a
one percentage point increase per year after the reform. Among less educated mothers, the
estimated trend break is smaller and not statistically significant in column (4). Similarly for
the average reform eﬀect, mothers with high education engaged in more sex selection after
the reform.16 The heterogeneous response to land reform by parental education suggests that
increased parental income is a plausible mechanism through which land reform increased sex
ratios.17,18
Our estimates are robust to including all births at the second parity or above. We compare
all 2+ births following sister(s) versus those following at least one son before and after land
reform in Appendix Table A.11. The estimated eﬀect is slightly larger for both the trend
break (0.8 percentage points) and average eﬀect (3.8 percentage points) models than that
from second births, consistent with greater sex selection at 3+ parity following no previous
son seen in cross-sectional analyses (Zeng et al., 1993).
To estimate the contribution of land reform to overall sex ratios, we calculate a weighted
15Appendix Table A.7 shows that estimates are robust to including children under age 4. Appendix Table
A.8 shows that estimates are robust to including families that report a diﬀerent number of surviving children
than that observed in the family.
16Similarly, Appendix Table A.9 shows that children of high-education fathers were more likely to be sons
after land reform.
17High-education parents have slightly weaker stated son preference than low-education parents: see Ap-
pendix Table A.10 using the China In-depth Fertility Survey, Phase I in 1985 and Phase II 1987. Greater
sex selection among high-education parents after land reform cannot readily be explained by diﬀerences in
preferences.
18In addition to income, education could aﬀect sex selection through an information channel (better
information-seeking on selection methods among the better educated). Access to sex selection technology
conditional on income and the information set might be the third channel.
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average eﬀect across diﬀerent parities using our estimates above. The weighted average eﬀect
of land reform on overall sex ratios is 3.8%.19 Given that the overall sex ratios in our sample
increased by 6.6% (from 1.06 in 1978 to 1.13 in 1986), land reform contributed to about 58%
of the increase in rural sex ratios in this period.
5.2 Land reform vs. the One Child Policy on sex ratios
Diﬀerences in start dates by county allow us to disentangle the eﬀect of land reform from
that of the OCP (Figure 2), which would not be possible in province-level or national data.
In this subsection, we focus on whether the county-level rollout of the OCP confounds the
eﬀect of land reform on sex ratios.
First, we run a “horse race” between land reform and the OCP in Table 2. For the
trend break model in column (1), we include two triple interaction terms as independent
variables, “Land reform*Event time*Girl first” and “OCP*Event time*Girl first”, where the
OCP indicator is equal to 1 if one is born after the OCP was introduced. We find that
arrival of the OCP does not generate a trend break as the coeﬃcient estimate is small and
insignificant. In contrast, the estimated trend break after land reform is robust to controlling
for the OCP eﬀect. In column (2), the estimated average eﬀect of land reform is very close
to that in Table 1. Again, we fail to find an average eﬀect of the OCP on sex ratios. These
findings suggest that the county-level rollout of the OCP does not confound the eﬀect of land
reform.20
19The estimated average reform eﬀect among 2+ births, 3.8 percentage points increase, implies a 16.5%
increase in sex ratios from the pre-reform level. The weighted average eﬀect is calculated as follows:
0*0.44+0*0.56*0.59+0.165*0.56*0.41=0.038.
20Nor did the 1.5 Child Policy introduced after 1984 confound the eﬀect of land reform (see Appendix
Table A.12). We do find that the 1.5 Child Policy could be an additional factor contributing to the increase
in sex ratios since the late 1980s.
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Table 2: Land Reform versus the One Child Policy
Male
Trend break Average eﬀect
All All pre-OCP post-OCP pre-HRS post-HRS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Land reform*Event time*Girl first 0.008**
(0.003)
OCP*Event time*Girl first -0.001
(0.003)
Land reform*Girl first 0.033*** 0.025** 0.039***
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
OCP*Girl first -0.004 -0.009 0.004
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
Observations 241,547 241,547 113,174 128,373 117,991 123,556
R2 0.051 0.051 0.054 0.048 0.053 0.048
County-by-year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Second, we also stratify the sample according to the timing of the two policies. We
estimate the average reform eﬀect rather than a trend break because of the short pre- or
post-reform period in these exercises. Estimates in columns (3) and (4) suggest that land
reform has a positive and significant eﬀect on the probability of second child being male
following a first girl for both pre- and post-OCP adoption periods. Thus, land reform has an
independent eﬀect.21 Interestingly, when stratifying the sample by the timing of land reform
in columns (5) and (6), we find the OCP has no eﬀect in both the pre- and post-land reform
periods. These findings further support that it is land reform rather than the OCP that
aﬀects sex selection among second births that follow an elder sister.
5.3 Fertility
In this section, we examine whether land reform aﬀects fertility and thus poses a sample
selection issue. Overall, we find land reform has little eﬀect on fertility, while the OCP only
has a modest eﬀect (in the expected direction). In column (1) of Table 3, we estimate the
eﬀect of land reform versus the OCP on overall fertility: the total number of births by county
and year. The estimate of land reform is very small and insignificant.
Fertility decreased by 3 percent after the OCP, and this estimated eﬀect from the county-
level rollout can be scaled up to replicate the national fertility trend in Figure 1B: both
21In Appendix Table A.13, we test the interactive eﬀect of land reform and the OCP by including their
interaction term. We do not find a statistically significant interactive eﬀect, although our confidence intervals
are relatively wide and include some large positive interactive eﬀects.
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are modest.22 For second births in column (2), neither land reform nor the OCP had a
statistically significant eﬀect. The absence of an OCP eﬀect is consistent with the rural
policy: a second child was allowed and financial penalties were on 3+ parity children in the
early to mid-1980s. Indeed, we find in Appendix Table A.4 that the decline in overall fertility
following the OCP in column (1) is mainly from fertility reduction at the third parity and
above.
Table 3: Fertility: number of births by county and year
ln(number of births)
All births Second births
(1) (2) (3)








Observations 11,864 11,649 22,532
R2 0.939 0.833 0.900
County FE and year FE Y Y
County specific linear trends Y Y
County-by-year FE Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%
level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
Turning to the fertility margin most relevant to our identification, we examine whether
land reform had diﬀerential fertility eﬀects depending on the sex of the first child. To imple-
ment, we change the unit of observation in column (3) to county by year by sex of the first
child. The estimate of “Land reform*Girl first” is small and insignificant, suggesting that
land reform does not aﬀect the number of second births diﬀerentially for first girl families
and first boy families. Therefore, selected second births may not be a major issue for our
main results on land reform.
22In Appendix Table A.3, we estimate the change in the national total fertility rate (TFR) after 1979. The
decrease is 5 percent from the pre-1979 average TFR. Furthermore, using province-by-year TFR, we find a
smaller decrease of 3 percent. These point estimates are similar to our estimate using the county-level OCP
rollout here, while estimates are less precise using national or provincial data. Fertility eﬀects of the OCP
in the early to mid-1980s were small because fines were mild for relatively rich families were not eﬀectively
collected from relatively poor families (Scharping, 2003). The level of fines increased significantly since the
late 1980s along with more strict enforcement.
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In contrast, the OCP has diﬀerential fertility eﬀects depending on the sex of the first child.
The positive and statistically significant estimate of “OCP*Girl first” indicates that families
with a first girl were 17.3 percentage points less likely to stop having a second child than
those with a first boy after the OCP. A resulting concern is that the change in composition
by the first child’s sex as a response to the OCP could aﬀect the estimated land reform eﬀect
in Table 2. In Appendix Table A.14, we use an inverse probability weighting approach to test
the robustness of our estimates.23 We find that re-weighted estimates are similar to estimates
in Table 2.
To summarize, we do not find evidence that fertility responses would compromise our
findings regarding land reform and sex selection. Furthermore, the modest fertility eﬀect we
find for the rural OCP (which maps to the national fertility trend, and in this respect diﬃcult
to dispute) would imply a minuscule eﬀect of the rural OCP on sex selection through the
fertility channel.24 The minuscule predicted eﬀect on sex selection is confirmed in Table 2.
6 Why did land reform increase sex selection?
It is well known that land reform boosted agricultural output and income. Here we discuss
economic motivations behind sex selection as induced by land reform. Empirically, we find
the most consistency with an income mechanism.
The income mechanism
We formalize a stylized sex selection model in Appendix A that allows sex selection and
fertility to respond to both income and the opportunity cost of childrearing (wage). We
assume that having a son provides utility to parents (Edlund, 1999), and a second son provides
no benefit beyond that of a daughter. To support this assumption, Appendix Figure A.1
reports the stated preference among rural parents from the China In-depth Fertility Survey
(Phase I in 1985 and Phase II 1987): they indeed desire just one son.25 We also assume
23In the sample of second children, we first predict the eﬀect of the OCP on the probability a second child
in a first boy family. Because fewer first boy families are in the sample of second births due to the OCP, we
use the predicted probability to assign larger weights to first boy families where the OCP eﬀects are larger.
We then run weighted regressions analogous to column (1) and (2) of Table 2.
24The 3% reduction in overall fertility comes from 12% fertility reduction among 3+ births (see Appendix
Table A.4). 67% of families had more than 3+ children prior to land reform. When the number of children
decreases from 3 to 2, the probability of having a son naturally decreases by 14%. Not all those with a
reduced likelihood of having a son naturally will sex select. The 1990 rural sex ratio of 1.14 implies that
roughly 2.3% of all parents selected a male successfully, or about 4.6% of those parents pregnant with girls.
Scaling that 1990 incidence up (arbitrarily) by an order of magnitude, assume that one third of parents would
sex select in response to reduced natural probability of having a son. This would imply that sex selection
increased by (14%*12%*67%)/3 or 0.4% due to OCP-induced fertility reduction.
25Among rural parents, 79% want a son next when they have not already had one, which drops to 31% for
parents who already have a son (the other 49% want a daughter and 20% no preference).
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selecting a son is costly. Travel costs for accessing ultrasound in provincial capitals were
non-trivial for rural parents (who were very poor on average at this time).26 Additionally,
sex selection might impose a psychic cost.27
In the model, parents maximize utility over having a second child, having a son, and
consumption. They decide among: 1) having a second child with sex selection, 2) having
a second child without sex selection, and 3) stopping childbearing following one child. We
allow for potentially competing wage and income eﬀects in the decision, as land reform may
have aﬀected both. The model first delivers unambiguous predictions of neither sex selection
for the first child nor the second child following a firstborn boy, which are supported by
results presented in Figures 4a, 4b and Table 1. More importantly, it predicts greater sex
selection of the second child following a firstborn girl in response to income or wage increases.
This prediction is analogous to that for consumption “goods” without close substitutes that
tend to be normal (Black et al., 2013). In contrast, the wage has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the decision to have a second child in the model, depending on the magnitudes of income vs.
substitution eﬀects (Appendix Section A.2).
Our main empirical finding that land reform aﬀects sex selection for first girl families is
consistent with predictions from the model. The income mechanism could also explain more
sex selection among high education parents after land reform. Furthermore, in Appendix
Section D.1, we find corresponding heterogeneity in sex selection by the magnitude of post-
reform income growth. The positive trend break in the fraction of males was concentrated
in counties with fast output growth after reform, while no trend break is found where grain
output had little growth.
In sum, our findings are consistent with the most basic price theoretic framework (and
intuition) where sex selection is costly.
The “productive son” mechanism
To consider the possibility that higher productivity and wages are expected from male chil-
dren,28 we extend our model so that sons increase wages (Appendix Section A.5.3). Clearly,
this increases the benefit to having two sons. As wage increases, parents can be more likely
to select both the first child’s sex and the second child’s sex following a firstborn boy, neither
of which is observed in the data. It is also generally not true from the “productive son” model
26We collected information on train ticket prices and hotel costs in large cities in the 1970s. Two nights of
hotel costed on average 9 RMB. Depending on the mileage, train tickets within province could cost from 0.5
to 4 RMB. Average rural income in 1980 was 191 RMB per person per year (Ravallion and Chen, 2007). If
one lived within a two-hour train ride (around 70-80 km) to the provincial capital, one such trip could cost
about 6% of one’s annual income. And multiple trips might be necessary to achieve (and confirm) a son.
27The psychological costs could be larger for postnatal sex selection.
28Qian (2008) found that increases in female-specific income, as captured by the relative price increase of
tea following tea price reform, increased the survival rate of girls.
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that parents are more likely to select the sex of the second child after a firstborn girl, unless
additional assumptions are imposed.
A distinct prediction of the “productive son” mechanism is more sex selection when the
return to male labor is higher. To evaluate this prediction, we compare land reform’s eﬀect
on sex ratios in counties more suitable for growing male-labor intensive crops versus those
more suitable for female-labor intensive crops in Appendix Section D.2. In the 1982 Census
microdata, cotton was the most female labor intensive crop, while fruit had been most male
labor intensive.29 To assess gender specific income, we use crop suitability indices based
on agro-climate conditions from the FAO Global Agro-Ecological Zones database. We first
ascertain that these indices do predict cropping patterns in China (Appendix Table A.16).
We then estimate the interactive eﬀect of the suitability index of each crop with “Land
reform*Girl first” on the fraction of males. Estimates of these interactions are all very small
and statistically insignificant (Appendix Table A.17). There is no pronounced heterogeneity
by gendered wages as the “productive son” mechanism would predict.
Other potential mechanisms
In Appendix Section D.3, we examine five additional hypotheses: i) if sons received more land
than daughters, this would reward sex selection; ii) if land reform destroyed the “collective
pension system”, parents may have been forced to rely more on their sons for old age support;
iii) if land reform weakened rural healthcare provision, girls may have suﬀered; iv) if land
reform weakened the authority of village administration, monitoring and enforcement of
any prohibitions on sex selection may have languished; v) if land reform loosened travel
restrictions, it could be easier for peasants to travel to access ultrasound. We do not find
these hypotheses consistent with the empirical evidence. That said, our evidence on these
mechanisms is more suggestive than dispositive and invites additional data collection and
analysis.
7 How did land reform increase sex selection?
Was sex-selective abortion feasible for rural Chinese in the early 1980s? Land reform gener-
ally preceded the arrival of ultrasound machines in rural China, but ultrasound had become
increasingly available in provincial capitals since the 1970s.30 Because railroad was the main
means of long-distance transportation at that time, we consider whether a county was con-
nected by railroad to provincial capitals where ultrasound machines were available.
2935% of workers who grew cotton were male, and 69% of workers who grew fruit were male.
30In our basic model in Appendix Section A.2, the costs of sex selection via ultrasound access include travel
costs to provincial capitals and psychological costs. In Appendix Section A.5.1, we extend the basic model
to include son-rearing costs that yield similar predictions.
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Using a digitized national map of railroad networks in 1980,31 we define railroad access
by whether a railroad line passed through a rural county. Every county on a railroad line
was connected to the capital city of the same province. 36% of rural counties had railroad
access. Access to ultrasound is defined as 1 if a county was connected by railroad to the
provincial capital that had ultrasound machines available after land reform. Counties that
are assigned 0 either had no rail connection or ultrasound machines were not yet available in
the (rail-connected) provincial capital (or both).
Results reported in Table 4 confirm the role of ultrasound access in urban hospitals in
sex selection. In column (1), the triple interaction term “Land reform*Girl first*Railroad to
provincial capital that had ultrasound” has a positive coeﬃcient statistically significant at
the 10 percent level, suggesting a larger land reform eﬀect if parents could take the train from
their home county to the provincial capital to access ultrasound.32 In column (2), we consider
the eﬀect of ultrasound access including all travel options to provincial capitals. We interact
Land reform*Girl first with a binary variable indicating whether ultrasound was available
in the provincial capital, which measures the total eﬀect that comes via ultrasound in the
province. Comparing estimates in column (1) and (2), we find that the majority of travel
to access ultrasound was via railroad.33 Finally, in column (2), the estimate of the double
interaction term “Land reform*Girl first” suggests a non-trivial and precisely estimated reform
eﬀect on sex ratios in places and years without access to ultrasound.34
31The railroad data are generously provided by Matthew Turner and digitized from SinoMaps Press (1982)
(Baum-Snow et al., 2012).
32A potential concern is that railroad access might also help peasants connect to a larger input or output
market or have more exposure to the urban environment. To isolate the eﬀect of ultrasound access from
that of rail access, in Appendix Table A.19 we include an additional interaction term “Land reform*Girl
first*Railroad to provincial capital”. The estimate of this newly included interaction term is small and
insignificant, suggesting that absent ultrasound technology in the provincial capital, rail access per se does
not increase the fraction of males following land reform.
33In our sample, 28% of births occurred in counties and years that had railroad to provincial capitals that
had ultrasound. In column (1), the increase in sex ratios through this channel after land reform is 0.0067
(0.024*0.28), which is 20.5% of the total eﬀect (0.0067/(0.0067+0.026)). In column (2), 79% of births occurred
in counties and years where ultrasound was available in the provincial capital. Therefore, the share through
ultrasound including all travel options is 22.9% ((0.012*0.79)/(0.032+0.012*0.79)), only slightly higher than
that through railroad.
34In Appendix Table A.20, we stratify the sample by a county’s distance to the provincial capital. We find
that the eﬀect through ultrasound is strongest for counties within 70 kilometers of the provincial capital.
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Table 4: Ultrasound access in provincial capitals
Male
(1) (2)
Land reform*Girl first*Railroad to 0.024*
provincial capital that had ultrasound (0.012)
Land reform*Girl first* 0.012⇤⇤
Provincial capital had ultrasound (0.005)




County-by-year FE Y Y
Notes: Column (1) also controls for Girl first and Girl first*Railroad to provincial capital that had ultrasound.
County-by-year fixed eﬀects absorb the double interaction of Land reform*Railroad to provincial capital with
ultrasound. Column (2) likewise controls for Girl first and Girl first*Provincial capital had ultrasound. The
double interaction of Land reform*Provincial capital had ultrasound in Column (2) is absorbed by the county-
by-year fixed eﬀects. Robust standard errors clustered at the county level are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
In addition to sex-selective abortion, postnatal sex selection could also be at play for
our results because our Census data are on surviving children.35 In Appendix Section E, we
conduct additional analysis on postnatal mortality using the 1992 UNICEF Chinese Children
Survey that reports childhood deaths. We find suggestive evidence that the mortality rate
among male second births following a firstborn girl decreased after the reform, and that
female mortality increased. Parents seem to have allocated some of the land reform bounty
to boys, which also contributes to the increase in the sex ratio of surviving children.
8 Conclusion and discussion
Policy makers in Asia have attempted to address high sex ratios by prohibiting prenatal
sex determination. China began restricting the use of ultrasound for sex determination
as early as 1986 and India issued a similar prohibition in 1994.36 As the persistence of
high sex ratios attests, prenatal sex determination technology is diﬃcult to regulate and
continues to improve.37 It is unclear whether bans provide much of a practical obstacle.
In our analysis, sex selection increased despite prenatal sex determination being unavailable
35Although postnatal selection renders a costly ultrasound unnecessary, the psychological costs of postnatal
selection could be large and thereby generate similar predictions regarding an income eﬀect as ultrasound.
Moreover, including son-rearing costs also leads to similar predictions.
36Six US states adopted bans on sex-selective abortion 2012-2014 (Rebouché, 2015).
37“[S]ex determination could turn into an entirely at-home exercise with home testing kits” (Rebouché,
2015). Morain et al. (2013) describe a “new era” in non-invasive prenatal testing.
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locally: poor farmers were willing to bear substantial travel costs. Likewise, fertility did not
fall substantially and still sex selection increased.
We find land reform contributed to about half of the increase in rural sex ratios from the
late 1970s to the mid-1980s, when sex selection began in earnest in China. Land reform’s
historical role in fomenting sex selection has been overlooked by researchers, we suspect,
because it was introduced at the same time as the One Child Policy, about which priors are
strong and county-level data heretofore unavailable. We estimate that land reform lead to
about 1 million missing girls (between 0.8 and 1.2 million, 95% confidence interval) in this
period. In later periods, land reform may continue to contribute as the trend break clearly
persists in Figure 1a.
Our findings add to the documented cultural preference for sons (DasGupta, 1987; Das-
Gupta et al., 2003) by showing that this preference may interact with household income: we
are unaware of existing sex ratio research estimating household income elasticities. From a
basic price theory perspective, such estimates are overdue. Son preference implies boys and
girls are imperfect substitutes. Like other costly consumption “goods” without a close substi-
tute, is having a son normal? Depending on the estimate of how much land reform increased
income, income elasticities of sex ratios range from 0.088 to 0.181 (Appendix Section F).
Using 0.088 and assuming a linear relationship between income and sex ratios, one would
project that the sex ratio in 2000 would be 1.2, similar to the actual sex ratio in the 2000
Census as shown in Figure 1a.38
We also benchmark our range of land reform elasticities against two other readily-available
“back-of-the-envelope” estimates. First, we consider the cross-country income elasticity in
four Asian economies where there is son preference: mainland China, India, South Korea
and Taiwan in Appendix Section G. For the 1975-1995 period, we find that a one percent
increase in GDP per capita is correlated with a 0.089 percent increase in sex ratios. The
analysis of cross-country data, while it includes country and year fixed eﬀects, is mainly
descriptive given the potential for confounding. At a minimum, the cross-country approach
does not cast doubt on a positive income elasticity. Second, we also consider a public policy
designed to increase incomes in rural China. Meng (2013) finds the anti-poverty program of
1994-2000 increased rural income by 38%. In Appendix Section G we see this increased the
overall sex ratios by 3.1%, which implies an income elasticity of about 0.082. Both estimates
are similar to the lower sex ratio elasticity estimate of 0.088.
As incomes continue to rise and the technology of sex selection disseminates and improves,
we might expect elevated sex ratios to increase or at least persist, including among Asians
in the West (Almond et al., 2013; Almond and Sun, 2017). On the other hand, ambitious
eﬀorts at “triggering normative change within the society as a whole” may be feasible and
38Rural income has increased by 220% from 1980 to 2000 (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).
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have already achieved some success in Korea (Chung and DasGupta, 2007).39 Given practical
challenges to enforcement, banning sex selection may ultimately be more eﬀective in the
normative message sent to parents about gender preference.
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